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Models  of  the  determinants  of  individuals’  primary  care  costs  can be  used  to  set  capitation  payments  to
providers and  to test  for horizontal  equity.  We  compare  the ability  of eight  measures  of patient  morbidity
and  multimorbidity  to predict  future  primary  care  costs  and  examine  capitation  payments  based  on
them.  The  measures  were  derived  from  four  morbidity  descriptive  systems:  17  chronic  diseases  in the
Quality  and  Outcomes  Framework  (QOF);  17  chronic  diseases  in  the  Charlson  scheme;  114  Expanded
Diagnosis  Clusters  (EDCs);  and  68 Adjusted  Clinical  Groups  (ACGs).  These  were  applied  to  patient  records
of  86,100  individuals  in 174  English  practices.  For  a given  disease  description  system,  counts  of diseases
and  sets of  disease  dummy  variables  had  similar  explanatory  power.  The  EDC  measures  performed  best
followed  by the  QOF  and  ACG  measures.  The  Charlson  measures  had  the  worst  performance  but  still
improved  markedly  on models  containing  only  age, gender,  deprivation  and practice  effects.  Comparisons
of  predictive  power  for different  morbidity  measures  were similar  for  linear  and  exponential  models,  but
the relative  predictive  power  of  the  models  varied  with  the  morbidity  measure.  Capitation  payments  for
an  individual  patient  vary  considerably  with  the  different  morbidity  measures  included  in the  cost  model.
Even for  the best  ﬁtting  model  large  differences  between  expected  cost  and  capitation  for  some  types  of
patient  suggest  incentives  for patient  selection.  Models  with  any  of  the  morbidity  measures  show  higher
cost  for  more  deprived  patients  but  the  positive  effect  of  deprivation  on  cost  was  smaller  in better  ﬁtting
models.
© 2014  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the CC  BY  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
1. Introduction
The relationship between patients’ primary care costs (con-
sultations, tests, drugs) and their characteristics (morbidity, age,
gender, socio-economic circumstances) is of interest for two  rea-
sons. First, primary care providers (general or family practitioners)
are increasingly paid prospectively via capitation fees to cover
the costs of patients for whom they have agreed to provide
care. Examples of health care systems with capitation payments
for general practice include Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Ontario, and the UK (Boerma,
2003; European Parliament, 1998; Sibley and Glazier, 2012). Cap-
itation payment has been advocated for primary care “medical
∗ Corresponding author.
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homes” in the US (Goroll et al., 2007) and at least one US insurance
scheme has experimented with capitation payments for primary
care providers (Ash and Ellis, 2012; Ellis and Ash, 2012). If fun-
ders wish to ensure that patients with greater needs for health care
carry a larger capitation, to reduce ﬁnancial incentives for providers
to cream skim or dump patients, or to give providers incentives
to improve outcomes, then it is necessary to know how patients’
expected cost varies with their characteristics (Schokkaert et al.,
1998; Sibley and Glazier, 2012; Ash and Ellis, 2012). Despite the
prima facie importance of morbidity as a determinant of health-
care costs, most primary care capitation systems currently relate
payments only to patient age and gender.
The second reason for interest in the relationship between the
cost of patients and their characteristics is to investigate whether
primary healthcare resources are equitably allocated. Horizontal
equity requires that patients in equal need should receive equal
amounts of health care. Multiple regression models of cost can be
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2014.02.005
0167-6296/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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used to test whether there is horizontal equity in the allocation
of primary care resources: after allowing for need, cost should not
vary with a patient’s socio-economic status (Gravelle et al., 2006;
Bago d’Uva, 2005). But if the data on patient morbidity are poor, any
association between socio-economic status and healthcare costs
may  not be due to horizontal inequity but to the correlation of
socio-economic status and unobserved aspects of morbidity.
Electronic patient records in general practices make it possi-
ble to obtain very detailed information on the medical history of
patients. The raw data are so rich1 that they must be aggregated to
produce morbidity measures which are useful for analysis.
The simplest approach is to group diagnoses into a manage-
able number of morbidity categories which can then be included in
regression models of patient costs as a set of dummy  variables indi-
cating the presence or absence of speciﬁc diagnoses. This assumes
that the effect of diagnoses is additive. But the cost of one patient
with both diabetes and depression may  be greater than the cost
of two patients, one with diabetes and the other with depression,
because it may  be more difﬁcult to control blood sugar levels for a
depressed patient. Conversely, there may  be cost savings with some
multimorbid patients. For example, heart disease and diabetes are
conditions where monitoring of cholesterol may  be required but
the associated costs need only be incurred once in a given period
for a patient with both conditions. Allowing for the possible non-
additive effects of multimorbidity is potentially important since the
proportion of the population who are multimorbid is non-trivial
(20% to 61% in our data set depending on the multimorbidity mea-
sure used) and has been growing over time (Hippisley-Cox and
Pringle, 2007).
The raw clinical data can be combined in many ways to produce
different sets of diagnostic categories and diagnostic categories can
in turn be combined in different ways to produce deﬁnitions of
multimorbidity. A recent review (Huntley et al., 2012) found 17
different multimorbidity classiﬁcation systems ranging from sim-
ple counts of the number of diagnoses, as in the Charlson system, to
elaborate classiﬁcation schemes such as the John Hopkins Adjusted
Clinical Groups (ACG) Case-Mix system (Johns Hopkins Bloomberg
School of Public Health, 2008) and the Hierarchical Conditions Clas-
siﬁcation (Pope et al., 2004).
The availability of different morbidity systems derived from the
same raw clinical data raises a number of questions. How much do
clinical measures of morbidity improve the performance of mod-
els of patient cost compared with simpler models based on age
and gender? Do measures which account for multimorbidity per-
form better than simpler morbidity systems which do not allow for
possible interactions amongst diagnoses? Does the morbidity sys-
tem used affect the relative performance of different estimators?
In terms of the two policy motives for estimating cost models: how
do capitation payments based on detailed clinical measures differ
from those based only on age and sex? Are estimates of the rela-
tionship between socioeconomic status and cost sensitive to which
morbidity system is used?
In this paper we address these questions using detailed clinical
data from 86,100 patients in 174 English general practices. We  con-
struct eight morbidity measures which we use in linear ordinary
least squares (OLS) models and in exponential (log link, Poisson)
generalised linear models (GLM). We  compare the goodness of ﬁt
of these models with a basic model containing only patient age,
gender, and deprivation. We  calculate capitation payments based
1 The electronic record systems in UK general practices use 85,000 Version 2
Read codes to record clinical information. The Read codes can be mapped into ICD-
10 which has over 9000 diagnostic categories in its ﬁnest classiﬁcation (excluding
chapters XX and XXII). See http://www.who.int/classiﬁcations/icd/en/.
on different morbidity schemes and compare capitation payments
with costs for selected types of patient. We  also compare the results
of a simple test of horizontal inequity using the different morbidity
schemes.
Our eight morbidity measures are derived from four morbid-
ity descriptive systems: 17 chronic diseases in the Quality and
Outcomes Framework (QOF); 17 chronic diseases in the Charlson
scheme; 114 Expanded Diagnosis Clusters (EDCs); and 68 Adjusted
Clinical Groups (ACGs). The Charlson measures have the worst per-
formance but still improve markedly on models containing only
age, gender, deprivation and practice effects. The EDC measures
perform best followed by the QOF and ACG measures. In general,
for a given disease description system, counts of diseases and sets
of disease dummy  variables have similar explanatory power. Sim-
ple counts of EDC or QOF conditions perform better than the more
elaborate ACG multimorbidity measure.
Rankings of the measures are broadly similar whether the cost
model was  linear (OLS) or exponential (GLM). However, the choice
of morbidity measure does affect the relative performance of the
two estimation methods. OLS is better than GLM with three of the
morbidity measures, GLM is better with three, and for two of the
measures GLM and OLS have virtually identical performance.
We use the cost models to calculate capitation payment as the
cost predicted for a patient given their age, gender, deprivation
and morbidity but removing the effect of the patient’s practice and
replacing it by the average of the practice effects. Capitation pay-
ments, at patient and at practice level, are sensitive to the choice of
estimation method and morbidity measure. We  also ﬁnd that the
difference between average cost and capitation for some types of
patient is often substantial, so that there are incentives for patient
selection, though less than when capitation is based only on age
and gender.
Our data do not permit the construction of sophisticated meas-
ures of horizontal inequity such as the concentration index: we
are limited to simple comparisons of cost for patients in different
deprivation deciles. Comparison of primary care cost for the top and
bottom deciles of deprivation suggests that there is pro-deprived
inequity even after allowing for clinically measured morbidity. Esti-
mates of the degree of inequity depend on the morbidity measure
used in the cost model. When only age, gender, deprivation, and
practice effects are included the ratio of the cost of patients in the
top deprivation decile relative to those in the bottom decile is 1.50.
The ratio is reduced to 1.19 when QOF indicators are added to the
model and to 1.15 when EDC indicators are used. Generally, the bet-
ter ﬁtting is the morbidity model the smaller is the ratio of costs
for patients in the top and bottom deprivation deciles.
1.1. Related literature
The ACG system has been used in studies of primary care costs
and utilisation in Canada (Reid et al., 2001), Spain (Orueta et al.,
1999), Sweden (Halling et al., 2006), the UK (Sullivan et al., 2005;
Omar et al., 2008), and the US (Starﬁeld et al., 1991). Ash and
Ellis, 2012 applied an extended version of the Hierarchical Clini-
cal Conditions morbidity system used in Medicare reimbursement
to explain the costs that primary care patients should have incurred
if managed appropriately. Some of these papers, as in Ash and
Ellis, 2012 have used concurrent morbidity from the period in
which costs were incurred and report R2 over 0.5. However, for
a prospective capitation system it is necessary to examine how
past morbidity predicts future costs. Studies using past morbid-
ity usually ﬁnd an R2 larger than 0.3, compared with an R2 below
0.1 from models using only data on patient age and gender. We
build on this previous work by comparing the predictive power
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of the ACG system with that of the QOF and Charlson morbidity
classiﬁcations.2
Previous studies of horizontal equity in primary care have
been based on population surveys with self reported health. Bago
d’Uva (2005), using the British Household Panel Survey, found that
patients with higher income had more consultations after con-
trolling for other socio-economic characteristics, and for previous
period patient reported health as measured by the General Health
Questionnaire, self assessed health, the number of health problems,
and an indicator of whether health limited daily activities. Morris
et al., 2005 used data from the Health Survey for England and found
a negative but insigniﬁcant association of income and higher social
class with consultations after controlling for current self reported
general health, the presence of long standing illnesses, and days of
acute illness. Generally as more measures of morbidity are included
in the analysis the degree of pro-poor inequity falls (van Doorslaer
et al., 2000). Other methods of allowing for unobserved differences
in morbidity also reduce measured pro-poor inequity. Bago d’Uva
et al. (2009) ﬁnd that using panel data to allow for unobserved
time invariant patient differences reduces the extent of pro-poor
horizontal inequity in GP visits in most European countries, in
some cases leading to pro-rich inequity. In Bago d’Uva et al. (2011),
using vignettes to allow for reporting bias and objective indicators
such as grip strength and date recall tests to instrument for self
reported health reduced the association of worse education with
more GP visits. Because we have a more limited measure of depri-
vation (ratios of cost for patients in different deprivation deciles)
we do not attempt a full analysis of horizontal equity, but our study
complements these previous investigations by showing that using
detailed clinical data on individual patients also reduces the extent
of pro-deprived inequity in use of primary care.
The payment system for primary care should take account of
provider altruism, the risk imposed on providers, and the incen-
tives for supplier inducement of demand, efﬁciency in production,
selection of patients, and gaming of reporting. The theoretical liter-
ature suggests that a mixed payment system is likely to be optimal,
combining elements of fee for service and capitation payments
related to patient characteristics (see McGuire, (2011) for a sum-
mary of the arguments). We  do not attempt to derive an optimal
payment system but our results are relevant in that they show that
the estimation of patient cost models for the capitation component
will be greatly improved by including detailed clinical morbidity
measures but that the choice of particular morbidity scheme will
have marked effects on capitation for individual patients. We  also
illustrate the magnitude of potential incentives for both patient
selection and gaming of reporting of patient morbidity.
The distribution of healthcare costs for individual patients usu-
ally has a long right hand tail and a spike at zero cost reﬂecting
non-use by a non trivial proportion of the population. This has led
to some debate about the appropriate estimation method for mod-
els of individual cost with suggestions including transformation of
the cost variable, two part models, and Generalised Linear Models
(GLMs) (Blough et al., 1999; Buntin and Zaslavsky, 2004; Manning,
2006; Manning and Mullahy, 2001; Manning et al., 2005; Mullahy,
1998). Although our main interest is in the implications of using
detailed clinical morbidity information in cost models rather than
econometric methods, our comparisons of GLM and OLS estima-
tors contribute to the debate over healthcare cost estimators. Ours
is the ﬁrst comparison using primary care data, rather than hospital
2 Previous comparisons of the predictive power of alternative morbidity and
multimorbidity schemes have focussed on hospital cost (Huntley et al., 2012;
Winkelman and Mehmud, 2007; Perkins et al., 2004).
or total health care costs, and it shows that the relative performance
of different estimators depends on the morbidity measure.
Section 2 describes the data and the estimation methods. The
model results are set out in Section 3 and their implications for
capitation discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. Methods
2.1. Data
2.1.1. Institutional setting
To receive primary medical care in the British National Health
Service (NHS) patients must register with a general (family)
practice, which also acts as gatekeeper for elective hospital care.
The NHS is ﬁnanced almost entirely from general taxation and
patients face no charges for NHS health care, apart from a small
charge for drugs prescribed in primary care. Because of the wide
range of exemptions on grounds of age, income, and health, around
90% of drug prescriptions carried no charge in 2007/8.
2.1.2. Sample
The General Practice Research Database (GPRD) contains pri-
mary care medical records for around 5 million patients currently
registered with general practices in the United Kingdom. The GPRD
is broadly representative of the general population in the UK
(Lawrenson et al., 1999).
An initial random sample of patients aged 18 years and over was
drawn from the 182 English practices included in the GPRD which
had ‘research standard’ data continuously from 1st April 2005 to
31st March 2008, and which had given consent to link patient data
to small area measures of deprivation. The sample was stratiﬁed
by age, gender and practice. We  dropped 8 practices with entirely
missing deprivation data. To use the most up-to-date resource use
data and the largest possible observation period for diagnoses, we
included the 86,100 individuals from the original sample who  were
alive and registered at one of the remaining 174 practices on 1st
April 2007. For the regression analysis we  dropped 154 individuals
with missing deprivation data.
2.1.3. Costing
We  applied national unit costs to the numbers of consulta-
tions, prescription drugs, and tests initiated within primary care
for each patient to calculate the total cost to the NHS of primary
care resources used during the NHS ﬁnancial year 1st April 2007
to 31st March 2008. All costs were valued in £ sterling at 2007/08
prices. Details of the costing procedures are in the Data Appendix.
2.1.4. Measures of morbidity and multimorbidity
We constructed eight alternative morbidity measures for each
patient (Table 1). In addition to measures based on the Quality and
Outcomes Framework we  chose measures based on the Charlson
Index and the John Hopkins ACG system because they are widely
used internationally and straightforward to operationalise with
routine data.
QOF diseases. We  used the 17 chronic conditions included in the
clinical domain of the 2006/7 version of the Quality and Outcomes
Framework which is a pay for performance scheme covering all
practices in the UK.3 This set of morbidity markers is simple and
has high face validity as the main business of general practices is
3 We used the QOF Business Rules Version 16 which outlines the clinical Version 2
Read codes and any additional criteria required to include a patient on the relevant
QOF disease register: NHS Primary Care Contracting. QOF Implementation Business
Rules v16. http://www.primarycarecontracting.nhs.uk/145.php.
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Table 1
Morbidity and multimorbidity measures.
Measure Number
diseases/categories
Range of measure Details
QOF disease dummy
variables
17
Not mutually exclusive
0–1 dummies 17 chronic diseases in the clinical domain of the UK Quality and
Outcomes Framework (QOF) pay for performance scheme: asthma,
atrial ﬁbrillation, cancer, coronary heart disease (CHD), chronic kidney
disease (CKD), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD),
dementia, depression, diabetes, epilepsy, heart failure, hypertension,
learning difﬁculties, mental health, obesity, stroke, and
hyperthyroidism.
QOF  disease count 17 0–17 Count of the QOF diseases.
Charlson disease
dummy  variables
17
Not mutually exclusive
0–1 dummies 17 diseases predictive of mortality: cerebrovascular disease (1),
chronic pulmonary disease (1), congestive heart disease (1), dementia
(1), diabetes (1), mild liver disease (1), myocardial infarction (1), peptic
ulcer disease (1), peripheral vascular disease (1), rheumatological
disease (1), cancer (2), diabetes with complications (2), hemiplegia and
paraplegia (2), renal disease (2), moderate or severe liver disease (3),
AIDS (6), and metastatic tumour (6). Not mutually exclusive. (Numbers
in parentheses are weights in Charlson Index score – see below.)
Charlson Index score 17 0–33 Weighted count of Charlson diseases. Weights reﬂect strength of
relationship with patient mortality.
Expanded Diagnosis
Clusters (EDCs)
dummy variables
114
Not mutually exclusive
0–1 dummies Chronic clinically related groupings of diagnoses.
Count  of EDCs 114 0–114 Count of EDCs.
Adjusted Clinical
Groups (ACGs)
68 mutually exclusive
categories
0–1 dummies Classiﬁcation into an ACG based on age, gender, combination of
morbidities, and expected cost. The age range of our sample meant we
used  only 68 out of 82 possible ACG categories.
Resource Utilization
Bands (RUBs)
6 mutually exclusive
categories
0–1 dummies ACGs grouped into 6 mutually exclusive Resource Utilization Bands on
the basis of expected costs; 0: No or only invalid diagnoses; 1: Healthy
Users; 2: Low; 3: Moderate; 4: High; 5: Very High.
dealing with chronic conditions, although it omits some chronic
conditions such as skin disease and liver disease.4 The 17 QOF
morbidities were included in the regression models as 17 dummy
variables. We  also use a count of the number of QOF morbidity
categories as a multimorbidity measure.
Charlson diseases. The Charlson Index is a weighted sum of
17 disease dummy  variables selected for their association with
mortality (Charlson et al., 1987). About half of the 17 conditions
are similar to those in the set of QOF chronic conditions, though
the precise deﬁnitions vary. As with the QOF diseases, we esti-
mated models with dummy  variables for the 17 Charlson diseases
and separate models with the Charlson Index as a multimorbidity
measure.5
The John Hopkins ACG Case-Mix System is also diagnosis-based
and was developed using administrative claims data in the United
States (Starﬁeld et al., 1991; Weiner et al., 1991). We  used the John
Hopkins software6 to construct four morbidity measures:
Expanded Diagnosis Clusters (EDCs) are groupings of clinically
similar diagnostic codes. An individual was assigned to an EDC if
they had any diagnosis relating to that EDC. We  designated 114 of
the 264 EDCs as representing a chronic condition (Salisbury et al.,
2011) and measured morbidity as a vector of 114 dummy  variables.
We also counted the number of chronic EDCs in which an individual
was included as a measure of multimorbidity.
Adjusted Clinical Groups (ACGs) are 68 mutually exclusive
categories deﬁned by diagnoses, duration, severity, diagnostic
4 Although reported disease prevalence affects the total QOF payment, Gravelle
et  al. (2010) found no evidence that practices gamed their reporting of the preva-
lence of QOF diseases, possibly because of the auditing of QOF data by local primary
care organisations.
5 We use an adaptation by Khan et al. (2010) which provides the clinical Version
2  Read codes for diagnosing each disease, using a translation from the widely used
Deyo adaptation of the Charlson Index for ICD-9 codes (Deyo et al., 1992).
6 We used the John Hopkins ACG System Version 8.2 (Johns Hopkins Bloomberg
School of Public Health, 2008) to obtain the EDC classiﬁcations.
certainty, aetiology, age and gender.7 At least 35 ACGs are for mul-
timorbid patients.
Resource Utilization Bands (RUBs). The ACG software groups
ACGs with similar expected cost into 6 Resource Utilization Bands
where higher bands are expected to have higher costs and patients
in them are more likely to be multimorbid.
Table 1 summarises the three morbidity measures (vectors of
QOF, Charlson and EDC morbidity markers) and the ﬁve measures
of multimorbidity (counts of the QOF, Charlson, and EDCs mark-
ers, plus ACG and RUB categories) used in our analysis. The QOF,
Charlson, and EDC morbidity categories were constructed using all
historic diagnoses on patients’ general practice records up to 31st
March 2007. The ACG and RUB measures use diagnoses over the
one-year period 1st April 2006 to 31st March 2007 (John Hopkins
Bloomberg School of Public Health, 2008).
2.1.5. Covariates
For each gender, we categorised age at 1st April 2007 into ten-
year age bands, with 90+ years as the upper category.
The Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 2007 is a widely used
summary measure of deprivation in seven dimensions (income,
employment, health and disability, education, housing, environ-
ment, crime) for small English areas. It is derived from 38
socioeconomic variables by a complex procedure involving fac-
tor analysis, ranking, exponentiation of ranks, and standardisation
(Department for Communities and Local Government, 2008). It is
calculated at Lower Super Output Area (LSOA)8 level. In order to
protect patient conﬁdentiality we  were provided only with the IMD
2007 decile of the LSOA in which a patient lives.
7 Though the ACG System Version 8.2 identiﬁes up to 82 default ACGs (or up to
93 with optional branching), the age range of our sample meant that some of these
categories were not populated.
8 There are 32,482 LSOAs in England with a mean population of 1500.
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Table  2
Patient primary care costs (£) 2007/8.
Age Number Mean cost SD Median % with zero cost
Male 20–29 6021 90 367 24 29.4
30–39  7204 113 300 26 29.9
40–49  8902 168 524 40 25.9
50–59  7486 282 530 92 19.7
60–69 6481 458 622 264 8.0
70–79  4112 681 722 484 2.5
80–89  1878 822 783 608 1.9
90+  253 567 510 428 6.3
Female 20–29 5551 176 239 106 7.0
30–39  6930 210 407 110 8.0
40–49 8447 240 429 111 7.0
50–59 7525 334 515 168 5.0
60–69  6563 483 636 293 2.6
70–79  4954 639 662 463 1.6
80–89  3057 709 772 555 1.3
90+  736 673 579 528 2.2
All  patients 86,100 330 563 134 12.3
Notes. Costs are the sum of the costs of prescriptions, tests, face to face or telephone consultations plus the costs of administration for repeat prescriptions and other
administration not requiring face to face or phone contact.
Because the deprivation measure is ordered and categorical we
enter it in the regression models as a set of dummy  variables for
deciles 2–10 (most deprived). We  test for horizontal inequity by
examining whether greater deprivation is associated with greater
or smaller cost. Because of the ordered and categorical nature of the
deprivation variable we do not compute the concentration index
which is the standard summary measure of horizontal inequity.
Patient conﬁdentiality also meant that we were provided with
anonymised practice identiﬁers so that we could attach a practice
dummy  to each patient but had no information on practice charac-
teristics such as the GP to patient ratio.
2.2. Modelling
We  estimated separate regression models of individual cost
using the eight morbidity and multimorbidity measures. The three
numerical multimorbidity measures (QOF count, Charlson Index
score, EDC count) and the ordered RUB multimorbidity measure
were included as dummy  variable categories to estimate the most
ﬂexible relationships between multimorbidity and cost. In our
dataset, the maximum QOF count was 10, the maximum Charl-
son score was 13, and the maximum EDC count was 28. We  used 6
categories for the QOF count (1,2,. . .,6 or more), 7 for the Charlson
(1,2,. . .,7  or more) and 18 for the EDC count (1,2,. . .,18 or more)
as there were few patients with larger numerical scores. We  used
dummy  variables for the 68 mutually exclusive ACG categories.
For the models with non-mutually exclusive QOF, Charlson, and
EDC morbidity categories, we used dummy  variables for each of
the categories.
All the explanatory variables are measured at the start of the cost
year 2007/8 with morbidity and multimorbidity variables based on
patient morbidity records up to 31st March 2007.
We report results from GLMs in which a link function of the
conditional expected 2007/8 cost of the i’th patient is linear in the
explanatory variables:
g(Eciadmp) = ˇ0 +
∑
a′
ˇa′Dia′ +
∑
d′
ˇd′Did′
+
∑
m′
ˇm′Dim′ +
∑
p′
ˇp′Dip′ (1)
The Dia are 15 age/gender group dummies, the Did are 9 deprivation
decile dummies, the Dim are morbidity or multimorbidity category
dummies, and the Dip are 173 practice dummies.
We  compare a log link (g(Ec) = ln Ec)  with a Poisson (vari-
ance equal to the mean) distribution and linear link (g(Ec) = Ec)
with a normal distribution. The log form allows for the right
skewness of the patient cost data and use of the GLM speciﬁca-
tion means that we do not have to correct for retransformation
bias (Manning, 1998) or adjust the dependent variable because
a proportion of patients have zero cost. With a linear link
function and a normal error distribution GLM  is equivalent
to OLS. The log link GLM speciﬁcation ln Ec = x′  ˇ or, equiv-
alently Ec = exp(x′ˇ), is also referred to as an exponential
model.
The GLM estimators are consistent and asymptotically normally
distributed as long as (1) is valid, but the distributional assumptions
need not be correct. For inference, robust standard errors were
calculated allowing for a general form of heteroskedasticity and
clustering of errors within practices. Models were estimated using
STATA 12.1.
We summarise model performance with four goodness of
ﬁt measures. The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz,
1978) penalises models with more explanatory variables. The
deviance-based R2D can be interpreted as the fraction of empiri-
cal uncertainty in total patient cost which has been explained by
the model (Cameron and Windmeijer, 1997). It is equal to the
usual R2 in an OLS model. Like the BIC its value depends on the
assumed error distribution and so cannot be used to compare
performance of the log link Poisson GLMs with the OLS mod-
els.
R2COR is the squared correlation coefﬁcient between the esti-
mated cost from a model and actual cost. For OLS regression models
it is equal to the usual R2 and hence to R2D. We  also compute the
mean absolute error (MAE), which is the average absolute differ-
ence in £’s between observed and estimated cost. R2COR and MAE do
not depend on the assumed error distribution and so can be used
to compare models with the same set of explanatories but different
error distributions.
3. Results
3.1. Summary statistics
The average total cost per patient was £330 of which 57% arose
from prescribed drugs, 35% from consultations, and the remaining
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Table 3
Goodness of ﬁt of alternative speciﬁcations of model for total patient cost.
Model speciﬁcation Log, Poisson Linear, Gaussian (OLS)
BIC R2
D
R2
COR
MAE BIC R2
COR
= R2
D
= R2 MAE
Age, gender (Model 1) 38446223 0.21 0.13 285 1320939 0.13 285
Age,  gender, and deprivation (Model 2) 38041309 0.22 0.13 283 1320555 0.13 284
Age,  gender, and practice (Model 3) 37725187 0.22 0.14 282 1322027 0.14 283
Age,  gender, deprivation, and practice (Model 4) 37522639 0.23 0.14 281 1321883 0.14 282
(Model 4) + QOF disease indicators 29339460 0.40 0.25 244 1302791 0.31 234
(Model 4) + QOF chronic disease count 28523441 0.42 0.29 239 1305547 0.29 240
(Model 4) + Charlson indicators 32546370 0.33 0.22 259 1310235 0.25 255
(Model 4) + Charlson Index score 32274547 0.34 0.23 258 1311982 0.23 260
(Model 4) + EDC indicators 26255449 0.46 0.29 231 1295660 0.37 222
(Model 4) + EDC count 26196861 0.46 0.32 229 1302546 0.31 236
(Model 4) + ACG 28694630 0.41 0.27 242 1308944 0.27 248
(Model 4) + RUB 30367472 0.38 0.24 250 1312522 0.23 259
Notes. BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion. Smaller BIC indicates better ﬁt and is comparable for different models with same error distribution. R2
D
: deviance based R2, which
is  comparable for different models with same error distribution. R2
COR
: squared correlation coefﬁcient from OLS regression of estimated cost on actual cost. For OLS models
R2
COR
, the deviance based R2
D
, and the model R2 are equal. MAE: mean absolute error. Estimation sample: 85,946 patients aged 20+ in 174 practices.
8% from tests and investigations.9 Table 2 shows that at most ages
women have higher costs but costs increase more rapidly with age
for men  and are higher for men  aged 70–79 and 80–89. The age-
gender pattern is similar to those in other UK datasets for the same
period (Hippisley-Cox and Vinogradova, 2009; NHS Information
Centre, 2008b). Like other healthcare cost data, our primary care
cost data are also right skewed (skewness 7.43, with the mean cost
being 2.5 times the median), although the proportion of patients
with no cost in 2007/8 is smaller (12.3%) than in typical distribu-
tions of hospital costs.
3.2. Overall model performance
3.2.1. Morbidity measures and model ﬁt
Table 3 shows that the inclusion of any measure of morbidity or
multimorbidity boosts the performance of the regression models
considerably. For example, with age and gender groups, depriva-
tion deciles, and practice effects the R2D for the log link Poisson
GLM speciﬁcation is 0.23. Adding the set of Charlson indicators,
the worst performing of the eight morbidity and multimorbidity
measures, to the model increases the R2D to 0.34. Similar increases
in performance are seen with the OLS model.
For any given estimation method, the rankings of the eight mor-
bidity and multimorbidity measures by the BIC, R2D, R
2
COR and MAE
criteria are very similar. In the log link Poisson GLM speciﬁcation,
the EDC count has the best performance on all goodness of ﬁt statis-
tics closely followed by the set of 114 EDC indicators. These two EDC
based measures are noticeably better than the QOF count, 68 ACG
indicators, 17 QOF disease categories, and the 6 RUBs, which in turn
are markedly better than the Charlson Index score and 17 Charlson
disease categories.
Under OLS estimation, the EDC indicators have the best perfor-
mance followed by the QOF indicators and then the EDC count. The
three sets of morbidity category dummies (EDC, QOF, Charlson)
performed better than the corresponding count multimorbidity
measures.
It is notable that using a simple count of EDC diagnoses as a
measure of multimorbidity does better than the more complex set
of ACG categories which were designed to describe multimorbid
patients. The ACG categories also have a worse overall performance
than the count of QOF diseases.
9 Fuller summary statistics on cost are in Brilleman et al. (2011).
3.2.2. Comparison of estimation methods
For the models without any morbidity or multimorbidity meas-
ures the log link Poisson models and OLS models have very similar
performance in terms of MAE  and R2COR for any given set of covari-
ates. With any of the morbidity or multimorbidity measures, both
the log Poisson GLM and OLS estimation methods have good
explanatory power, comparable with similar types of studies of
primary care costs. However, the relative performance of the two
estimation methods is dependent on the morbidity measure used.
The log link Poisson GLM has lower MAE  and higher R2COR than OLS
for three of the eight models with morbidity or multimorbidity
measures, OLS does better for three, and there is essentially no
difference for two  models.
Our results contrast somewhat with previous comparisons of
OLS and GLM models for hospital costs (Gravelle et al., 2011; Van
de Ven and Ellis, 2000). This may  be because our sample is small rel-
ative to these studies,10 though our data have a smaller proportion
of zero cost patients than is usual in hospital cost studies. However,
the difference in explanatory power is not large and OLS estimation
with the 114 EDC categories had the lowest MAE  and highest R2COR
over all sets of explanatory variables and estimation methods.
3.3. Morbidity measures: distributions and cost ratios
Tables 4–6 show the percentage of patients in different mor-
bidity categories for each of the 8 morbidity and multimorbidity
measures and also the effect on cost of being in those morbidity
categories.
The distribution of the EDC count has a larger range than the
QOF chronic disease count and Charlson Index score because of
the greater number of relatively minor diseases that the EDC
count includes. According to the QOF chronic disease count 20% of
patients were multimorbid (had a count of two or more) whereas
61% were multimorbid according to the EDC count. Women had
slightly higher scores than men  on the three count multimorbidity
measures (QOF count, Charlson Index score, EDC count). There were
signiﬁcant positive Spearman rank correlations amongst these
three count measures (for the top censored counts used in the mod-
els) – QOF and Charlson: 0.63; QOF and EDC: 0.72; Charlson and
EDC: 0.59.
There are differences across the QOF, Charlson and EDC  mor-
bidity categorisations in the proportions of patients with some
10 In Gravelle et al. (2011) models were estimated on samples of around 5M
patients.
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of the diseases. For example, 14.3% of patients have asthma in
the EDC scheme but only 6.5% in the QOF scheme. The QOF pay-
ments for asthma patients relate mainly to the monitoring of
patients and therefore patients require a recent inhaler prescrip-
tion to be classiﬁed as asthmatic, whereas EDC requires only a
diagnosis of asthma. The QOF distinguishes between asthma and
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and so only records 2.1% of
patients as having chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, whereas
the Charlson scheme records 16.6% as having chronic pulmonary
disease because its deﬁnition includes asthmatics.
Tables 4–6 give cost ratios for the morbidity categories
from the log link GLM model which estimates ln Ec = x′ˇ
or Ec = exp(x′ˇ). Since all explanatory variables are binary,
the cost ratio for a variable xk is the ratio of expected
cost when xk = 1 to the expected cost when xk = 0 and is
exp(ˇk * 1 +
∑
j /= kˇjxj)/exp(ˇk * 0 +
∑
j /= kˇjxj) = exp ˇk.
For multimorbidity measures (QOF count, Charlson count, and
EDC count, ACGs, RUBs) which place patients in mutually exclusive
categories, the cost ratio is relative to a zero count or to non-users.
For example, in Table 5, a patient with an EDC count of 4 has
an expected cost which is 6.13 times as large as a patient with a
zero EDC count. For the three sets of non-mutually exclusive mor-
bidity dummies (QOF diseases, Charlson diseases, EDCs) the cost
ratio is the cost of the disease relative to not having that disease,
rather than to not having any disease. For example, in Table 4,
a patient diagnosed as having cancer under the QOF  scheme has
an expected cost 1.74 times as large as the average patient with-
out cancer (including those with other QOF diagnoses or no QOF
diagnosis).
Amongst the QOF morbidity categories epilepsy is the chronic
disease with the biggest relative effect (2.32 compared with no
epilepsy), though only 0.9% of the sample have the condition. The
most common QOF condition is hypertension (18.2% of the sample)
with a cost ratio of 1.42. All the QOF disease cost ratios are signiﬁ-
cantly greater than 1 but their range is limited (1.09–2.32). The 17
Charlson diseases also have a similarly limited range of cost ratios
(0.98–2.43).11
Of the 114 EDCs cost ratios, 82 are signiﬁcant. All but 8 are less
than 2.0 and the largest (Transplant status) has a cost ratio of 3.6
(but only 0.05% of patients are in this category). Table 5 reports
some examplar categories.
The baseline ACG category is non-users and all other categories
have a cost ratio in excess of 1. The results for selected ACGs in
Table 6 suggest that in general patients with more morbidities have
higher costs. Cost ratios increase with RUB levels in the table, which
also suggests that multimorbid patients are more costly as patients
in higher RUBs are more likely to be multimorbid.
The cost ratios for the three count measures increase with
the counts (except for EDC counts 14 and 17, which are slightly
smaller, respectively, than EDC counts 13 and 16) implying, like
the ACG and RUB results, that patients with more diseases have
higher costs. We  re-estimated the QOF count and EDC count log
Poisson models with the counts and their squares rather than
with categories for the counts. We  found that the estimated
proportionate effect of an additional disease on the cost ratio
declines with the number of diseases. Plots of predicted costs
against the EDC count, QOF count, Charlson score and RUB level
(see Brilleman et al., 2011) suggests a roughly linear, rather than
exponential, effect of increasing multimorbidity on the level of
costs.
11 Patients with AIDS do not increase general practice costs signiﬁcantly because
in  the UK their care and the prescribing of AIDS drugs are generally managed in
secondary care.
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Table 5
Patients and cost ratios for selected EDC categories and EDC count.
Selected EDC categories EDC count
Category % patients Cost ratio 95% CI Count % patients Cost ratio 95% CI
None 19.39 1.00 – 0 19.39 1.00 –
Low  back pain 25.80 1.10 (1.08,1.13) 1 19.56 2.11 (2.01,2.21)
Dermatitis and eczema 19.57 1.12 (1.09,1.15) 2 16.36 3.34 (3.20,3.48)
Hypertension 18.36 1.38 (1.35,1.42) 3 12.54 4.64 (4.44,4.85)
Anxiety, neuroses 16.50 1.21 (1.18,1.24) 4 9.20 6.13 (5.85,6.42)
Depression 16.21 1.29 (1.26,1.33) 5 6.75 7.73 (7.37,8.11)
Asthma 14.26 1.50 (1.46,1.54) 6 4.90 9.08 (8.65,9.53)
Cervical pain syndromes 13.20 1.10 (1.07,1.12) 7 3.51 11.01 (10.40,11.66)
Arthritis 11.17 1.13 (1.09,1.16) 8 2.41 12.16 (11.49,12.86)
Irritable bowel syndrome 6.78 1.19 (1.14,1.23) 9 1.74 13.74 (12.92,14.61)
Gastroesophageal reﬂux 6.70 1.27 (1.23,1.31) 10 1.25 15.02 (14.13,15.97)
Acute myocardial infarction 5.84 1.26 (1.22,1.30) 11 0.82 16.96 (15.81,18.20)
Malignant neoplasm of the skin 2.53 1.07 (1.02,1.12) 12 0.57 17.18 (15.89,18.58)
Malignant neoplasms, breast 1.09 1.56 (1.46,1.68) 13 0.36 19.52 (17.87,21.32)
Emphysema, chron bronchitis, COPD 2.38 1.30 (1.24,1.36) 14 0.27 19.05 (17.17,21.13)
15  0.15 21.04 (18.65,23.73)
16  0.09 24.69 (21.43,28.46)
17  0.07 24.00 (19.98,28.83)
18+ 0.08 27.60 (24.08,31.63)
Notes. Estimates from GLM log Poisson model also including age, gender, deprivation and practice effects. Cost ratios for disease categories are the estimated costs for a
patient  with the relevant disease divided by the estimated cost for a patient without that disease. Cost ratios for counts are the estimated costs for a patient with the relevant
count  divided by the estimated cost for a patient with no disease (zero count).
3.4. Practice effects
Including ﬁxed practice effects in the models contributes little
to model performance. Adding practice effects to models with only
age and gender or only age, gender and deprivation increases model
R2D by at most 0.01. Dropping all the practice ﬁxed effects from the
full EDC count model reduces the R2D by 0.02.
The practice dummy  variables pick up the effects of charac-
teristics of practices such as the GP to patient ratio, idiosyncratic
practice treatment styles, and differences in the practice means of
both observed and unobserved patient characteristics. The small
impact of including practice dummies suggests that there is little
cross practice variation in the means of observed variables, and that
there is little cross practice variation in the unobserved practice
level factors or that they have little effect.
3.5. Age and gender
When morbidity measures are included in the cost model the
qualitative pattern of the unconditional age and gender means
in Table 2 is maintained but the effects of age and gender on
cost are greatly reduced. For example, the conditional effect of
being male aged 80–89 is 2.38 times as large as being male aged
20–29 according to the log Poisson model with EDC morbidity cat-
egories, whereas the ratio of the unconditional mean costs is 9.13.
Older patients are more costly mainly because they are sicker than
younger patients.
3.6. Deprivation and horizontal inequity
Table 3 shows that adding the measure of patient socioeco-
nomic status (small area deprivation decile) to models with age
and gender (Model 2 vs Model 1) or models with age, gender and
practice effects (Model 4 vs Model 3) leads to only modest improve-
ments in model ﬁt. Adding the deprivation measure to models with
morbidity has similarly small effects.
In all the models, with or without morbidity measures, patients
in higher deprivation deciles have greater cost (Table 7). The uncon-
ditional cost ratio between the 10th and 1st deprivation deciles is
1.50 and all the conditional cost ratios between the 10th and 1st
deprivation decile from models which include a morbidity measure
are also statistically signiﬁcantly greater than 1.00. Our  results sug-
gest that there is horizontal pro-poor inequity in primary care even
after allowing for rich clinical morbidity measures.
Table 6
Patients and cost ratios for selected ACG categories and for Resource Use Bands.
Selected ACG categories RUB
Category % patients Cost ratio 95% CI Band % patients Cost ratio 95% CI
Non-users 9.44 1.00 – Non-user 9.44 1.00 –
No  diagnosis or only unclassiﬁed Diagnosis 20.05 2.58 (2.40,2.77) Healthy user 36.36 3.28 (3.06,3.51)
Preventive/administrative 6.47 4.04 (3.72,4.39) Low morbid 25.03 5.60 (5.22,6.01)
Acute  minor, age 6+ 9.63 4.25 (3.95,4.57) Moderate 27.26 9.54 (8.90,10.23)
Chronic medical: stable 2.49 7.06 (6.49,7.68) High 1.70 13.44 (12.36,14.62)
2–3  Other ADG combinations, age 35+ 9.98 8.93 (8.31,9.60) Very high 0.20 16.02 (13.81,18.58)
4–5  Other ADG combinations, age 45+, no major ADGs 1.83 10.90 (10.05,11.82)
4–5  Other ADG combinations, age 45+, 1 major ADG 2.28 12.50 (11.56,13.51)
6–9  Other ADG combinations, age 35+, 0–1 major ADG 1.52 16.32 (15.03,17.71)
10+ other ADG combinations, age 18+, 2 major ADGs 0.05 21.75 (16.90,27.99)
6–9  other ADG combinations, male, age 18–34, 1 major ADG 0.01 46.78 (20.99,104.22)
Notes. Estimates from GLM log Poisson model also including age, gender, deprivation and practice effects. Cost ratios for mutually exclusive ACG categories (or RUBs) are
the  relevant model estimated costs for a patient in the ACG (or RUB) category divided by the estimated cost for a patient with no use. ADGs: Adjusted Disease Groups are
combinations of diagnoses used to construct Adjusted Clinical Groups.
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Table  7
Effect of deprivation on cost with different morbidity measures.
Model Model R2
COR
Proportionate
difference in cost
between 10th and 1st
deprivation decile
95% CI
Age/gender, deprivation, practice (Model 4) 0.14 1.50 [1.40,1.60]
Model  4 + QOF indicators 0.25 1.19 [1.12,1.27]
Model 4 + QOF count 0.29 1.20 [1.13,1.28]
Model  4 + Charlson indicators 0.22 1.33 [1.24,1.41]
Model  4 + Charlson Index 0.23 1.34 [1.26,1.43]
Model  4 + EDC indicators 0.29 1.15 [1.09,1.23]
Model  4 + EDC count 0.32 1.22 [1.15,1.29]
Model  4 + ACG categories 0.27 1.33 [1.25,1.42]
Model 4 + RUB 0.24 1.38 [1.30,1.47]
Notes. All models are estimated as GLM log link, Poisson. OLS results are similar.
Previous studies have found that the positive relationship
between low socioeconomic status and utilisation of primary care
is weakened by allowing for self reported patient morbidity and
by other methods of reducing unobservable patient heterogeneity.
With EDC indicators the estimated cost ratio is reduced from 1.50 to
1.15 and 6 of the 9 ratios of cost relative to cost in the lowest decile
are not signiﬁcantly different from 1.00 at the 5% level. Table 7
shows that including other detailed clinical morbidity measures
also reduces the cost ratio between the 10th and 1st deciles. In
general, the better ﬁtting is the model, the smaller is the cost ratio
between most and least deprived deciles.
3.7. Sensitivity analyses
There were some patients with extremely high costs: the high-
est four costs ranged from £15,128 to £27,810 compared to the
median cost of £134. The use of the log link in the GLM models
reduced this discrepancy considerably (the log of the highest cost
was 10.233 compared to the log of the median of 4.895). Dropping
patients above the 99th cost centile (£2471 or 7.812 in logs) led to
slight improvements of all models but did not alter their relative
performance.
We  also estimated GLM models with a log link and gamma
error distribution (error variance proportional to the square of the
mean). In all cases, the log link gamma  models had higher MAE  and
smaller R2COR than the log link Poisson models. The R
2
COR was  much
smaller for the models with EDC indicators (0.03 vs 0.29) and QOF
indicators (0.11 vs 0.25).
We experimented with a more elaborate method of measuring
multimorbidity using the QOF disease categories, rather than using
a simple count. We  added 136 dummy  variables for each pair wise
combination of the 17 QOF categories to the OLS model with the 17
QOF categories. This led to only a small improvement in the model
R2 from 0.314 to 0.324 compared to the simpler model with 17 QOF
disease categories.12
4. Capitation payments and morbidity measures
Most primary care capitation systems compute capitation pay-
ments for patients using only mean costs by age and gender. To
examine the implications of the availability of detailed morbidity
data for capitation payments Table 8 compares capitation pay-
ments based only on age and gender (Model 1)13 with payments
12 See Brilleman et al. (2013) for a discussion of the cost implications of particular
pairwise combinations of QOF conditions.
13 In the English NHS capitation fees are based on the results from two  studies of
the  determinants of consultation rates and consultation length, as measures of GP
based on regression models which also include patient morbidity
measures.14 We  compute a patient’s capitation as their expected
cost given their age, gender, deprivation and morbidity. To ensure
that a patient’s capitation is not affected by which practice they
belong to we  replace the estimated effect of the patients’ practice
with the average of the practice effects. We normalise capita-
tion payments so that they sum to total cost across the whole
sample.
Capitation payments for individual patients differ substantially
across the six models. On the whole, capitations from models with
morbidity measures are more closely correlated with those from
other models including morbidity (range 0.617–0.849) than with
those based on age and gender only (range 0.490–0.677). There are
also generally smaller average absolute differences between capi-
tations based on models including morbidity (range £81 to £154)
than between capitations from these models and capitation based
only on age and gender (range £134 to £176). These average abso-
lute patient capitation differences across models are large relative
to the mean patient cost of £330.
The underlying model used to compute the capitation makes
much less of a difference at practice level. To illustrate this we
show in the ﬁnal column the mean absolute differences between
total “practice” capitation as a proportion of total cost. Because
our 10% random sample of patients in 174 practices has just under
500 patients from each actual practice we group sample patients
randomly in 17 artiﬁcial “practices” of just over 5000 patients to
provide a more realistic illustration of practice level differences.
The differences between total payments computed using models
with different morbidity measures are small: the largest differences
are just over 1%.
One potential problem with capitation regimes is that practices
have a ﬁnancial incentive to select patients if capitation differs
from the cost which the practice expects the patient to impose
on the practice. The absolute difference between capitation and
actual cost for an individual patient is likely to overstate the incen-
tive for selection since some of the future cost of a patient is pure
noise and not predictable even with full knowledge of the patient’s
workload. The study of consultation length did not include any morbidity variables
and  the consultation rate study was based on area level data and used area measures
of mortality and of patient reported morbidity (Formula Review Group, 2007). Fund-
ing for general practice prescribing is allocated by a formula derived from a practice
level model of prescribing costs which included three practice level disease preva-
lence measures (Department of Health, 2011). Data conﬁdentiality meant that we
could not identify practices and so could not compare capitation based on morbidity
with actual NHS capitation payments. Given the speciﬁcities of the NHS capitation
system, a comparison with simple age and gender based capitation has more general
lessons.
14 To save space we do not report results with the three worst performing mor-
bidity measures (Charlson indicators, Charlson Index, RUBs).
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Table 8
Capitation payments with different morbidity measures and estimation methods.
Model vs Model Individual patient capitation Practice capitation
Correlation coefﬁcient Mean patient absolute
difference between
capitation payments
(£s)
Mean total absolute
practice difference as a
proportion of practice
total cost
Age and gender only QOF disease indicators 0.571 134.3 0.0044
QOF  count 0.660 162.2 0.0085
EDC indicators 0.490 158.3 0.0053
EDC count 0.621 175.8 0.0106
ACG  0.677 153.0 0.0078
QOF  disease indicators QOF count 0.849 80.5 0.0068
EDC  indicators 0.746 104.1 0.0068
EDC  count 0.697 148.9 0.0112
ACG  0.636 150.0 0.0112
QOF  count EDC indicators 0.694 124.9 0.0087
EDC  count 0.794 136.9 0.0091
ACG  0.732 148.4 0.0056
EDC  indicators EDC count 0.803 101.4 0.0070
ACG  0.617 153.9 0.0062
EDC  count ACG 0.756 148.6 0.0100
Notes. Capitation payments calculated from age/gender only are the age/gender means. All other capitation payments are calculated from log Poisson models containing
age/gender, deprivation decile, practice effect and morbidity, but with average practice effects replacing the estimated effect of the patient’s practice. Practice differences
are  computed by randomly assigning patients to 17 “practices” of around 5056 patients. Capitation payments calculated from OLS models give similar results.
current medical condition. To illustrate the magnitude of potential
incentives for patient selection, we examine the difference
between the average capitation payment15 for particular types of
patient and their average cost.
Table 9 shows the difference between average capitation from
different cost models and mean actual cost for various patient
types deﬁned by age, gender, diagnoses, and, in some cases, also by
deprivation.16 Patients with a diagnosis have only that diagnosis.
Thus, because there are more EDC diagnoses than QOF diagnoses,
we see that there are more women aged 20–29 in the highest depri-
vation decile who have no QOF disease than have no EDC disease.
Conversely, because there are more non-QOF diseases than non-
EDC diseases, women aged 20–29 with no QOF disease also have
higher average cost than women aged 20–29 with no EDC disease.
Capitation based only on age/gender mean costs exceeds the mean
cost of patient types with no diagnoses but is much less than mean
cost for types with high cost. For some patient types, such as men
aged 40–49 with EDC asthma, mean capitation exceeds mean costs
for all capitation calculations. For others, mean capitation is less
than mean cost by a considerable margin, for example for men  aged
50–59 with QOF obesity and diabetes. It is not however necessarily
the case that there are bigger differences between mean capitation
and mean cost for patient types with high costs. The highest cost
type shown (men aged 70–79 with QOF hypertension, CHD and
CKD) with a mean cost of £983 has smaller selection incentives for
all models than men  aged 50–59 with QOF obesity and diabetes
who have a substantially smaller mean cost of £644.
Table 9 also illustrates a second potential problem with capi-
tation based on morbidity: it creates incentives to “up-code” i.e.
report additional diseases for a patient in order to boost capitation
15 When the deﬁnition of a patient type does not depend on deprivation, patients
of  that type will have capitation which varies with their deprivation.
16 Since practice effects had little explanatory power and do not greatly affect
estimated coefﬁcients on morbidity and other explanatory variables, the capitation
payments are very similar to predicted cost. Thus the differences between mean
costs and capitations also provide an indication of how well the model estimates
costs for particular patient types.
payments.17 For example, adding a diagnosis of QOF hyperten-
sion for a female patient aged 50–59 with no QOF  disease will
boost capitation based on QOF disease categories by, on average,
£110.18 Under QOF count based capitation, payment will increase
by £228. Similarly adding a diagnosis of EDC hypertension to a
female patient aged 50–59 with no EDC disease will increase capi-
tation by £31 when capitation is based on EDC indicators and £74
when it is based on the EDC count. However, it is not always the
case that the gains from up-coding are smaller with the ﬁner EDC
disease categorisation. Adding a diagnosis of QOF hypertension for
a man  aged 40–49 with QOF asthma boosts capitation by £31 under
QOF count based capitation, but adding a diagnosis of EDC hyper-
tension for a man  aged 40–49 with EDC asthma increases capitation
by £66 under EDC count based capitation.
Capitation based only on age and gender creates bigger incen-
tives for patient selection than capitation based on cost models
which also include individual morbidity measures. By contrast mis-
coding is less of a problem under age and gender based capitation
since it is easier for funders to audit the age and gender of patients
rather than their morbidity.
5. Conclusion
5.1. Discussion
Adding measures of individual patient morbidity produces a
considerable boost in the explanatory power of cost models. Using
ﬁner categories of morbidity improves the prediction of patient
costs. Thus measures using the 114 EDC categories were bet-
ter than those using the 17 category QOF scheme, whether the
categories were used to measure morbidity as a set of dummy
variables or used to construct counts of disease categories to mea-
sure multimorbidity. The QOF based measures of morbidity and
17 Most health care systems have a large enough number of practices to ensure
that  no single practice would be able to inﬂuence the estimated model coefﬁcients,
and hence the capitation formula, by strategic reporting.
18 Under the QOF indicators model the capitation for a women aged 50–59 with
no QOF disease is £221 (mean cost £175, plus the £46 excess of average capitation
over mean cost) and for a woman aged 50–59 with QOF hypertension it is £331
(mean cost £350 plus the −£19 excess of average capitation over mean cost).
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Table  9
Difference between capitation and average cost for selected patient groups.
Patient type N patients % of sample Mean cost Average capitation from model minus mean cost
Age/gender
mean
QOF
indicators
QOF count EDC indicators EDC count ACG
Female, 20–29, deprivation
decile 10, no QOF disease
546 0.64% 145 31 14 −13 21 14 33
Female, 20–29, deprivation
decile 10, no EDC disease
198 0.23% 103 73 60 43 25 −40 39
Female, 50–59, no QOF
disease
3787 4.41% 175 159 −15 46 42 51 84
Female, 50–59, QOF
hypertension
439 0.51% 350 −16 −19 38 −10 26 11
Female, 50–59, no EDC
disease
1003 1.17% 91 243 79 133 −25 78 100
Female,  50–59, EDC
hypertension
113 0.13% 155 179 96 70 45 −15 88
Male,  40–49, QOF asthma 270 0.31% 270 −101 −63 −6 −62 −29 −53
Male,  40–49, QOF asthma
and hypertension
21 0.02% 548 −379 −231 −129 −258 −215 −250
Male,  40–49, EDC asthma 188 0.22% 102 67 46 37 31 11 46
Male,  40–49, EDC asthma
and hypertension
10 0.01% 155 14 13 22 6 24 24
Male,  50–59, QOF obesity &
diabetes
49 0.06% 644 −363 −213 −77 −213 −171 −231
Male,  70–79, QOF
hypertension & CHD
110 0.13% 755 −74 −83 66 −61 −3 3
Male,  70–79, QOF
hypertension, CHD &
CKD
30 0.03% 983 −302 −27 73 16 −29 −96
Male,  20–29, EDC
dermatitis/eczema &
anxiety/neuroses
28 0.03% 106 −16 −11 −6 −7 15 2
Female, 40–49, EDC IBS 63 0.07% 122 118 75 58 43 0 66
Female, 40–49, EDC IBS &
depression
28 0.03% 201 39 20 24 −4 −8 26
Female, 20–29, deprivation
decile 10, ACG category:
No Diagnosis or Only
Unclassiﬁed Diagnosis
106 0.12% 131 45 35 46 19 45 −36
Male,  70–79, ACG category:
Chronic Medical: Stable
161 0.19% 620 61 150 158 −17 92 33
Notes. Capitation payments calculated from age/gender only are the age/gender means. All other capitation payments are calculated from log Poisson models containing
age/gender, deprivation decile, practice effect and morbidity, but with average practice effects replacing the estimated effect of the patient’s practice. Capitation payments
calculated from OLS models give similar results. IBS: irritable bowel syndrome.
multimorbidity performed considerably better than the Charlson
based measures which had the same number of morbidity cate-
gories. The poor performance of the widely used Charlson Index
score and of the Charlson disease dummy  variables may  be because
the Charlson scheme was originally intended to predict mortal-
ity rather than the cost of general practice activities. The two  QOF
based measures had about the same predictive power as the 68
mutually exclusive ACG categories derived using purpose built
case-mix software. This may  be because the 17 QOF categories were
selected for a primary care pay for performance scheme targeted at
care for chronic patients who are the main business of general prac-
tices. The ACG categories included non-chronic diagnoses which
were grouped in part by their anticipated effect on all patient costs,
including hospital costs.
We found that the morbidity measure had an effect on the rel-
ative performance of the OLS and GLM log link Poisson estimators
although the differences in performance for a given morbidity mea-
sure were not large. The choice of morbidity measure has a bigger
impact on model performance than the choice of estimator.
Although we were limited to a fairly crude ordered categorical
and summary measure of socio-economic status, our results are
in line with the previous literature: more deprived patients had
greater cost but the association became weaker when morbidity
measures were included in the cost model. The better ﬁtting the
cost model, the smaller was  the association between deprivation
and cost.
A major reason for interest in predicting primary care cost is
to inform the calculation of capitation payments. We  found that
capitation payments for individuals vary considerably with the
morbidity system used in the cost models, though the choice of
morbidity system had much less effect on total payments to prac-
tices.
There were considerable potential capitation increases from up-
coding, i.e. from overstating the number of diagnoses for patients
when capitation was  based in part on morbidity. Conversely, incen-
tives for patient selection were reduced markedly when morbidity
information was  used to calculate capitation payments. However,
even when capitation was  based on models including morbidity
measures the difference between average capitation and average
cost for certain types of patient was still sizeable compared to aver-
age patient costs.
The models were estimated on data from a sample of English
general practices. However, similar data are increasingly available
in other countries and our conclusions, that morbidity measures
based on detailed clinical records greatly improve the ability to
predict primary care costs but that choice of measure affects both
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the performance of the cost model and the individual capitation
payments based on it, are likely to apply in other health care sys-
tems.
The ACG and Charlson morbidity categories were originally
derived and calibrated on US data and the QOF categories were
developed as part of a UK pay for performance scheme. The
institutional differences across countries mean that the choice
of morbidity measure for computing capitations requires inves-
tigation using country speciﬁc data. It would also be useful to
examine alternative methods of producing summary morbidity
measures from the very detailed raw clinical information on indi-
vidual patients, including, for example, factor analysis (Fang et al.,
2008). These investigations would also be improved by richer socio-
economic data than we were able to use and by panel data to allow
for unobserved patient factors. Given the importance of prescrip-
tion costs it may  also be useful to examine how much separate
modelling of prescribing and other costs would improve predictive
power.
5.2. Simpler is better?
The best performing multimorbidity measures were simple
counts of the number of chronic conditions patients suffered from
or simple sets of disease dummies. It is notable that using an 18 cat-
egory count of EDC diagnoses as a measure of multimorbidity does
better than the more complex set of 68 ACG categories which were
designed to describe multimorbid patients. The ACG categories also
have a worse overall performance than the seven category count
of QOF diseases. It is possible that, when morbidity descriptive sys-
tems are designed to predict cost in a speciﬁc institutional setting,
more elaborate schemes will do better than simple ones. But sim-
plicity has other virtues. Simpler morbidity and multimorbidity
schemes are easier for patients and GPs to understand. Setting cap-
itation fees based on morbidity requires that patient morbidity be
measured every budgetary period for every patient and more com-
plex schemes have higher measurement and computation costs.
Thus there may  be a trade-off between simplicity and predictive
power when alternative morbidity measures are considered.
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Appendix A. Data Appendix
We  calculated the total cost of primary care resources used by
each patient during the NHS ﬁnancial year 1st April 2007 to 31st
March 2008 by applying national average unit costs to the num-
bers of consultations, prescription drugs, and tests initiated within
primary care. All costs were valued in £ sterling at 2007/08 prices.
Consultations included all face-to-face (including surgery
consultation, home visit, clinic, out of hours) and telephone con-
sultations. The unit cost of each consultation was  based on a
combination of consultation type and primary staff role (type of
general practitioner, practice nurse or other health care profes-
sional leading the consultation). The unit costs for consultations
are shown in Table A1. They include costs of administrative activ-
ities such as the recording of results or sending mail to a patient
when this was performed by a receptionist, administrator, or sec-
retary. Unit costs were taken from Curtis, 2008 and from a report
on national average GP earnings and expenses based on GP tax
returns (Technical Steering Committee, 2010). The unit costs in
Curtis, 2008 are derived by estimating a national average annual
cost for each type of staff, dividing by the national average number
of hours worked per year, and combining this cost per hour with an
estimated average encounter time for each type of staff. The costs
include salaries, training costs, and premises.
Although payments to a practice vary with performance under
the QOF and with the prevalence of QOF diseases in the practice,
the unit costs used to cost primary care activity in a particular
practice are based on national average payments to GPs and so are
not affected by the prevalence of QOF diseases in that practice.
Unit costs for prescription drugs were based on information
provided by the GPRD which combined data from several sources,
including the National Drug Tariff for generic products, and man-
ufacturers for branded products. Each prescription drug in the
patient level data was matched to unit cost using drug name,
strength and formulation. Where there was more than one unit
cost for a prescription drug we used the median unit cost.
To allow for possible ambiguities in the mapping of recorded
drug quantities to costs we also computed a measure of prescrip-
tion costs using data from the prescription cost analysis of the NHS,
2008a which provides information on the net ingredient cost of all
prescriptions dispensed in the community in England. We  used the
British National Formulary (BNF) code (BRM, 2010) to attach these
average costs to each prescription in the GPRD data, ignoring the
quantity speciﬁed in the prescription. Our results are not sensi-
tive to the method for calculating prescribing costs. Using national
average amounts per prescription rather than recorded amounts
to calculate total primary care costs reduced model performance
somewhat but estimated effects were similar and the model rank-
ings were unchanged. Ambiguities in the recording of the amount
of a given drug prescribed will have only small effects on practice
capitation based on the coefﬁcients from estimated cost models
and will not create incentives for misreporting of morbidity.
Estimated drug costs use data on prescriptions issued by the
practice, not on drugs actually dispensed to patients, as NHS data
systems for dispensing are primarily used to remunerate pharma-
cists. Not all prescriptions issued to patients result in the dispensing
of medicines. One study estimated that 5.2% of prescriptions writ-
ten in a general practice were not dispensed (Beardon et al., 1993).
Our drug costs are therefore an overestimate. Whether this results
in biased estimates of the effects of morbidity and other vari-
ables depends on whether the propensity to have prescriptions
dispensed is correlated with the explanatory variables.
With advice from a general practitioner member of the research
team (SP) we determined which tests were performed within a
standard surgery consultation and applied a zero unit cost, save for
the cost associated with any consumables such as pregnancy test
kits or urine dipsticks. Unit costs for the remaining tests were based
on the National Health Service (NHS) Reference Costs (Department
of Health, 2009). For laboratory tests the unit cost was  based
on pathology discipline. Hospital-based tests and investigations
requested by the practice were costed using the NHS Reference
Costs.
We included cost data for patients who  were alive and regis-
tered with our sample practices on 1st April 2007 at the start of the
ﬁnancial year 2007/8. We  made no adjustment for patients who
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Table  A1
Unit costs (£, 2007/08) per primary care encounters.
Staff type Surgery
consultation
Home visit Clinic Telephone
consultation
Out of hours
GP: partner 24.47 81.37 35.98 14.85 36.97
GP:  registrar/associate 15.92 52.92 23.40 9.66 24.05
GP:  sole practitioner 27.55 91.61 40.51 16.72 41.63
Practice nurse 9.00 – 9.00 5.46 –
Counsellor 64.00 – – – –
Other  health care professional 15.00 – 15.00 9.10 –
deregistered from the practice list during the resource use year.
Thus if patients moved to another practice during the year, their
total primary care costs deﬁned to include those incurred in other
practices, would be under recorded in our data. If the aim is to esti-
mate future costs which will be incurred by the practice in which
the patient is initially registered this does not present a problem. On
average, setting capitation fees based on our results would ensure
that practices would be paid for costs actually incurred by patients
on their list at the start of the year. A retrospective adjustment could
be made at the end of the ﬁnancial year for costs attributable to
newly registered patients. We  also make no adjustment for patients
who die. Such patients may  have higher costs but to the extent that
the morbidity measures are correlated with mortality in the com-
ing year the estimated effects of different types of morbidity will
include some of the differentially higher costs of patients at higher
risk of death.
References
Ash, A., Ellis, R., 2012. Risk adjustment payment and performance assessment for
primary care. Medical Care 50, 643–653.
Bago d’Uva, T., 2005. Latent class models for use of primary care: evidence from a
British panel. Health Economics 14, 873–892.
Bago d’Uva, T., Jones, A.M., van Doorslaer, E., 2009. Measurement of horizontal
inequity in health care utilisation using European panel data. Journal of Health
Economics 28, 280–289.
Bago d’Uva, T., Lindeboom, M.,  O’Donnell, O., van Doorslaer, E., 2011. Education-
related inequity in healthcare with heterogeneous reporting of health. Journal
of  the Royal Statistical Society Series A 174 (3), 639–664.
Blough, D.K., Madden, C.W., Hornbrook, M.C., 1999. Modeling risk using generalized
linear models. Journal of Health Economics 18, 153–171.
Boerma, W.,  2003. Proﬁles of General Practice in Europe. An Interna-
tional Study of Variation in the Tasks of General Practitioners. NIVEL,
http://www.nivel.nl/sites/default/ﬁles/bestanden/proﬁles-of-general-
practice-in-europe.pdf.
Brilleman, S.L., Gravelle, H., Hollinghurst, S., Purdy, S., Salisbury, C., Windmeijer, F.,
2011. Keep it simple? Predicting primary health care costs with measures of
morbidity and multimorbidity. CHE Research Paper 72 (November).
Brilleman, S.L., Purdy, S., Salisbury, C., Windmeijer, F., Gravelle, H., Hollinghurst,
S.,  2013. Implications of comorbidity for UK primary care costs: a retro-
spective observational study. British Journal of General Practice 63 (609),
e274–e282.
Buntin, M.B., Zaslavsky, A.M., 2004. Too much ado about two-part models and trans-
formation? Comparing methods of modelling Medicare expenditures. Journal of
Health Economics 23, 525–542.
Beardon, P., McGilchrist, M., McKendrick, A., McDevitt, D., MacDonald, T., 1993.
Primary non-compliance with prescribed medication in primary care. British
Medical Journal 307, 846–848.
British Medical Association and Royal Pharmaceutical Society, 2010.
http://bnf.org(accessed 12.05.11).
Cameron, A.C., Windmeijer, F.A.G., 1997. An R-squared measure of goodness of ﬁt
for  some common nonlinear regression models. Journal of Econometrics 77 (2),
329–342.
Charlson, M.E., Pompei, P., Ales, K.L., Mackenzie, C.R., 1987. A new method of
classifying prognostic co-morbidity in longitudinal-studies – development and
validation. Journal of Chronic Diseases 40 (5), 373–383.
Curtis, L., 2008. Unit Costs of Health and Social Care 2007 PSSRU. University of Kent.
Department for Communities and Local Government, 2008. The English
Indices of Deprivation 2007. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
20120919132719/http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/
pdf/733520.pdf
Department of Health, 2009. NHS Reference Costs 2007/08. NHS,
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/Publications
Library/index.htm (accessed 10.05.11).
Department of Health, 2011. Resource Allocation: Weighted Capitation Formula,
7th  edition, http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod consum dh/groups/dh digitalassets/
documents/digitalasset/dh 124947.pdf (accessed 05.09.11).
Deyo, R.A., Cherkin, D.C., Ciol, M.A., 1992. Adapting a clinical comorbidity index for
use with ICD-9-CM administrative databases. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology
45  (6), 613–619.
van Doorslaer, E., Wagstaff, A., van der Burg, H., Christiansen, T., De Graeve, D., Duch-
esne, I., Gerdtham, U.-G., Gerﬁn, M.,  Geurts, J., Gross, L., Häkkinen, U., John, J.,
Klavus, J., Leu, R.E., Nolan, B., O’Donnell, O., Propper, C., Puffer, F., Schellhorn,
M.,  Sundberg, G., Winkelhake, O., 2000. Equity in the delivery of health care in
Europe and the US. Journal of Health Economics 19, 553–583.
Ellis, R., Ash, A., 2012. Payment in support of effective primary care for chronic
conditions. Nordic Economic Policy Review 2, 191–210.
European Parliament. Health Care Systems in the EU.  A Comparative Study, Direc-
torate General for Research. Working Paper. May  1998; http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/workingpapers/saco/pdf/101 en.pdf
Fang, H., Keane, M.,  Silverman, D., 2008. Sources of advantageous selection: evi-
dence from the Medigap insurance market. Journal of Political Economy 116
(2),  303–350.
Formula Review Group. Review of the General Medical Services global sum
formula, British Medical Association and NHS Employers 2007; http://www.
nhsemployers.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/frg report ﬁnal cd 090207.pdf
(accessed 05.09.11).
Goroll, A., Berenson, R., Schoenbaum, S., Gardner, L., 2007. Fundamental reform of
payment for adult primary care: comprehensive payment for comprehensive
care. Journal of General Internal Medicine 22, 410–415.
Gravelle, H., Dusheiko, M., Martin, S., Rice, N., Smith, P., Dixon, J., 2011. Mod-
elling individual patient hospital expenditure for general practice budgets. CHE
Research Paper, 72.
Gravelle, H., Morris, S., Sutton, M.,  2006. Economic studies of equity in the consump-
tion of health care. In: Jones, A.M. (Ed.), Elgar Companion to Health Economics.
Edward Elgar, pp. 193–204.
Gravelle, H., Sutton, M.,  Ma, A., 2010. Doctor behaviour under a pay for performance
contract: treating, cheating and case ﬁnding? Economic Journal 120, F129–F156.
Halling, A., Fridh, G., Ovhed, I., 2006. Validating the Johns Hopkins ACG case-mix
system of the elderly in Swedish primary health care. BMC  Public Health 6 (171),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1471-2458-6-171.
Hippisley-Cox, J., Pringle, M.,  2007. Comorbidity of Diseases in the New General
Medical Services Contract for General Practitioners: Analysis of QRE-
SEARCH data. QRESEARCH http://www.qresearch.org/Public Documents/
DataValidation/Co-morbidity%20of%20diseases%20in%20the%20new%20GMS%
20contract%20for%20GPs.pdf
Hippisley-Cox, J., Vinogradova, Y., 2009. Trends in Consultation Rates in General
Practice 1995 to 2008: Analysis of the QResearch database. Final Report to the
NHS Information Centre and Department of Health. National Health Service
(NHS) Information Centre and QResearch.
Huntley, A., Johnson, R., Purdy, S., Valderas, J., Salisbury, C., 2012. Measures of
multimorbidity and morbidity burden for use in primary care settings: a
systematic review and guide. Annals of Family Medicine 10 (2), 134–141,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1370/afm.1363.
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 2008. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg
School of Public Health. The Johns Hopkins ACG, Baltimore.
Khan, N.F., Perera, R., Harper, S., Rose, P.W., 2010. Adaptation and validation of
the  Charlson Index for Read/OXMIS coded databases. BMC Family Practice 11,
available from: ISI:000274624100001.
Lawrenson, R., Williams, T., Farmer, R., 1999. Clinical information for research; the
use of general practice databases. Journal of Public Health Medicine 21 (3),
299–304.
Manning, W.G., 1998. The logged dependent variable, heteroskedasticity, and the
retransformation problem. Journal of Health Economics 17, 283–295.
Manning, W.G., 2006. Dealing with skewed data on costs and expenditures. In: Jones,
A.M. (Ed.), Elgar Companion to Health Economics. Edward Elgar, pp. 439–446.
Manning, W.G., Mullahy, J., 2001. Estimating log models: to transform or not to
transform? Journal of Health Economics 20, 461–494.
Manning, W.G., Basu, A., Mullahy, J., 2005. Generalised modelling approaches to
risk adjustment of skewed outcomes data. Journal of Health Economics 24,
465–488.
McGuire, T., 2011. Physician agency and payments for primary care. In: Glied, S.,
Smith, P. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Health Economics. Oxford University
Press, pp. 603–623.
122 S.L. Brilleman et al. / Journal of Health Economics 35 (2014) 109–122
Morris, S., Sutton, M.,  Gravelle, H., 2005. Inequity and inequality in the use of health
care in England: an empirical investigation. Social Science and Medicine 60,
1251–1266.
Mullahy, J., 1998. Much ado about two: reconsidering retransformation and the
two-part model in health econometrics. Journal of Health Economics 17,
247–281.
National Health Service (NHS) Information Centre, 2008a. Prescription Cost Analysis
2007. NHS.
National Health Service (NHS) Information Centre, 2008b. Prescriptions Dispensed
in  the Community, Statistics for 1997 to 2007. NHS, England.
Omar, R.Z., O’Sullivan, C., Petersen, I., Islam, A., Majeed, A., 2008. A model based on
age, sex, and morbidity to explain variation in UK general practice prescribing:
cohort study. British Medical Journal 337, http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.a238.
Orueta, J., Lopez-de-Munain, J., Baez, K., Aiarzaguena, J., Aranguren, J., Pedrero, E.,
1999. Application of the Ambulatory Care Groups in the primary health care
of  a European national health care system: does it work? Medical Care 37 (3),
238–248.
Perkins, A.J., Kroenke, K., Unutzer, J., Katon, W.,  Williams, J.W., Hope, C., Callahan,
C.M., 2004. Common comorbidity scales were similar in their ability to pre-
dict health care costs and mortality. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 57 (10),
1040–1048.
Pope, G., Kautter, J., Ellis, R., Ash, A., Ayanian, J., Iezzoni, L., Ingber, M.,  Levy, J., Robst,
J.,  2004. Risk adjustment for Medicare capitation payments using the CMS-HCC
model. Health Care Financing Review 25 (4), 119–141.
Reid, R.J., MacWilliam, L., Verhulst, L., Roos, N.P., Atkinson, M., 2001. Performance
of  the ACG case-mix system in two Canadian provinces. Medical Care 39 (1),
86–99.
Salisbury, C., Johnson, L., Purdy, S., Valderas, J.M., Montgomery, A.A., 2011. Epidemi-
ology and impact of multimorbidity in primary care: a retrospective cohort
study. British Journal of General Practice 61 (582), 18–24.
Schokkaert, E., Dhaene, G., Van de Voorde, C., 1998. Risk adjustment and the trade-
off  between efﬁciency and risk selection: an application of the theory of fair
compensation. Health Economics 7, 465–480.
Schwarz, G., 1978. Estimating dimension of a model. Annals of Statistics 6 (2),
461–464.
Sibley, L., Glazier, R., 2012. Evaluation of the equity of age-sex adjusted primary care
capitation payments in Ontario, Canada. Health Policy 104 (2), 186–192.
Starﬁeld, B., Weiner, J., Mumford, L., Steinwachs, D., 1991. Ambulatory care groups
–  a categorization of diagnoses for research and management. Health Services
Research 26 (1), 53–74.
Sullivan, C.O., Omar, R.Z., Ambler, G., Majeed, A., 2005. Case-mix and variation in
specialist referrals in general practice. British Journal of General Practice 55
(516), 529–533.
Technical Steering Committee, 2010. GP Earnings and Expenses 2007/08. NHS Infor-
mation Centre.
Van de Ven, W.,  Ellis, R., 2000. Risk adjustment in competitive health plan markets.
In:  Culyer, A., Newhouse, J. (Eds.), Handbook of Health Economics, vol. 1. Elsevier,
Amsterdam.
Weiner, J.P., Starﬁeld, B.H., Steinwachs, D.M., Mumford, L.M., 1991. Development
and application of a population-oriented measure of ambulatory care case-mix.
Medical Care 5, 452–472.
Winkelman, R., Mehmud, S., 2007. A Comparative Analysis of Claims Based Tools
for  Health Risk Assessment. Society of Actuaries, www.soa.org/ﬁles/pdf/risk-
assessmentc.pdf (accessed 18.10.11).
